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This study assesses the inventory and productivity performance of the Japanese and US
automotive industries in recent decades. Within each country we distinguish between
vehicle assemblers and parts suppliers. In Japan, assemblers and suppliers made dramatic
inventory reductions and productivity gains, particularly during the 1970s. By
comparison, we find an unbalanced pattern for the United States: American assembly
plants have been streamline~ but parts suppliers have stagnated. In both countries our
findings suggest a strong association between inventory reduction and productivity growth
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INTRODUCTION
In recent decades the automotive industries of Japan
and the United States have experienced dramatic
transformations. One major development has been
the adoption of a set of process innovations
commonly known as ‘just-in-time’ (JIT) martufactur-
ing. Pioneered by Toyota in the late 1950s, JIT
methods were widely implemented in Japan starting
in the late 1960s, making their way to North America
about a decade later (Im and Lee, 1989; Nakarnura,
Sakakibara and Schroeder, 1994).
A central feature of JIT is the ability to operate
with minimal levels of inventory. Inventory reduction
exposes defects in the manufacturing process, forcing
managers and workers to eliminate sources of
variability and waste (Schonberger, 1982).
Operations managers commonly view inventory
l Correspondence to: Marvin B. Lieberman, Anderson Graduate
School of Management, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481,
USA
Contract grant sponsor MIT International Motor Vehicle Program,
UCLA Center for International Business Education and Research.
CCC 0143-6570/97/020073--13 $17.50
~ 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
levels as indicators of process capability and
efficiency. An analysis of Japanese auto assemblers
and suppliers (Lieberrnan and Demeester, 1995)
shows that inventory reductions were followed by
significant gains in productivity, with an average lag
of about one year. Thus, inventory levels are
important indicators of manufacturing performance.
Concument with the diffusion of JIT, various
researchers have drawn productivity comparisons
between the Japanese and US automotive industries. 1
Most studies have concluded that Japenese producers
attained a significant productivity advantage over
North American automakers by the early 1980s, with
the gap subsequently narrowing. Other work has
documented the close links between vehicle assem-
blers and parts suppliers in Japan, identi~ing these as
a key factor in Japan’s success.2
This paper compares the Japanese and US auto-
motive industries in recent decades, with specific
focus on relative inventory levels and rates of
productivity growth. We use available data from
national censuses and company financial reports to
compute benchmark measures of inventory and
productivity. Within each country, we distinguish
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between the auto assemblers and their component
suppliers. Prior comparisons of the Japanese and US
automotive industries have tended to emphasize the
assemblers, oflen ignoring the larger parts supply
sector.3 Our analysis reveals radical differences in
performance between suppliers and assemblers in the
United States. This contrasts with the situation in
Japan, where the two groups have improved in
parallel.
In particular, we show that Japanese automotive
suppliers and assemblers have made remarkably
similar progress over a long period of time, whereas
US suppliers and assemblers have not. The evidence
suggests that in recent years the American assemblers
(with the possible exception of General Motors) have
made substantial gains, reaching parity with average
Japanese levels of inventory and productivity.
Typical US suppliers, though, have stagnated. This
disparity in performance within the US automotive
sector has many possible explanations, but it high-
lights the relative success of the Japanese companies
in coordinating and improving operations along the
entire production supply chain.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. The next section describes the types of
inventories within the automotive supply chain, and
how they are related to the time required for materials
flow and processing. The third section utilizes census
data to compare the magnitude of inventories in
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Japan and the USA. It begins with an assessment of
the total inventories within the automotive supply
chain, which are then disaggregate into two
components: (1) work-in-process held internally by
parts suppliers and vehicle assemblers, and (2) inter-
firm inventories. The fourth section compares the
productivity growth of Japanese and US assemblers
and suppliers, based on data from census and
company financial reports. The final section con-
cludes the paper with a summary of the findings and
discussion of their implications.4
INVENTORIES WITHIN THE AUTOMOTIVE
SUPPLY CHAIN
To achieve JIT production, inventories must be
reduced to minimal levels. In the automotive supply
chain, the relevant inventories are (1) work-in-
process (WIP) held internally by parts suppliers and
vehicle assemblers, and (2) buffer inventories
between firms. The latter can be divided into tinished
goods (FG) held by the upstream supplier, and raw
materials (RM) held by the downstream customer.
The amount of time required to convert basic
materials into finished products depends directly on
the magnitude of these inventories.
Figure 1 is a diagram which represents the
inventories in a simplified automotive supply chain.
A finaI assembler at the end of the chain obtains parts
. Assembler --.,,
/ \
..
,= , ;s1--2: ~ ~me-
Figure 1. Inventories in hypothetical supply chain
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from two suppliers (S2 and S2”), each of which has
an additional upstream supplier (S 1 and S 1*). To
facilitate comparison, assume that the two sets of
suppliers provide identical components to the assem-
bler. The vertical axis of the diagram represents the
accumulation of product value; the horizontal axis
represents elapsed time. Inventory stocks, by defini-
tion, are proportional to areas under the graph.
Trapezoidal areas correspond to work-in-process
inventones. (The slope rises as products accumulate
value during processing.) Rectangular areas corre-
spond to inter-firm inventories (finished goods and
raw materials).
The diagram suggests how inventory levels are
related to the speed of materials flow. The two sets of
suppliers in Fig. 1 differ drastically in their inventory
levels. The supplier pair, S 1/S2, suffers from long
processing times, leading to high levels of WIP
inventory. Moreover, these fmns hold substantial
stocks of raw materials and finished goods, which
may be needed as a buffer if process breakdowns or
other problems occur frequently. By comparison, the
S1 */S2* supplier pair produces an identical product
in a much shorter period of time. By eliminating
sources of production variability and delay, this
supplier pair is able to operate with substantially less
inventory. As drawn in Fig. 1, the total ‘cycle time’
(measured from the receipt of materials by the
upstream supplier, to completion of the vehicle by
the assembler) equals T for the fist set of suppliers,
but only F for the second. In general, for a given
volume of output, the amount of inventory in the
supply chain rises in proportion to the cycle time.
INVENTORY ANALYSIS
Our analysis of automotive supply chain inventories
is based on annual data from the Census of
Manufactures (Kogyo Tolwi-hyo) of Japan, and the
US Annual Survey of Manufactures.s We define total
supply chain inventories as the sum of raw materials
(RM), work-in-process (WIP), and finished goods
(FG) held by parts suppliers, plus raw materials and
work-in-process held by automotive assemblers. We
exclude inventories of finished automobiles.
The Japanese and US Censuses subdivide the
assembler and supplier categories, respectively. In
Japan, where automotive assembly is oi?en subcon-
tracted, separate figures are reported for ‘contract’
and ‘core’ assemblers. (Core assemblers have their
own design capability and market under their own
name.b) The US Census provides separate classifica-
tions for ‘motor vehicle parts and accessories’ (SIC
3714) and ‘automotive starnpings’ (SIC 3465), as
well as several minor parts categories.’ In both
countries, the Census figures are aggregated from
information collected from individual manufacturing
plants. Thus, the parts supply operations of the US
‘Big-3’ automakers are incorporated into the Census
classifications for automotive components. We limit
our definition of the supply chain to categories that
can be clearly identified as automotive parts, sold
primarily as original equipment rather than after-
market replacement.g
Our analysis covers the period from 1967 through
1993. The start date is motivated by the fact that the
US Annual SurvqI of Manufactures did not provide
separate inventory data on auto suppliers and
assemblers until 1967. Moreover, the late 1960s
marks the initial spread of JIT methods in Japan
(Lieberman, Demeester and Rivas, 1995).
Total Supply Chain Inventories
Figure 2 is a graph that compares the total inventories
in the automotive supply chain in Japan and the USA
from 1967 to 1993. Total inventories were obtained
by adding the inventories held by parts suppliers
(RM + WIP + FG) and vehicle assemblers (RM -t-
WIP), and dividing by the assemblers’ annual sales.
Table 1 reports numerical results of these calculations
with data averaged over the initial four years ( 1967–
70) and the final four years (1990-93) of the sample.
Supply chain inventones have been declining
significantly in both Japan and the USA. Important
differences are nevertheless apparent. Table 1 shows
that in the late 1960s, total supply chain inventories
(per unit of final sales) were about 50% larger in the
USA than in Japan. Over the next two decades these
inventones fell by 44°/0 in Japan, but only 34°A in the
USA. Thus, by the early 1990s the automotive supply
chain in the USA held nearly twice as much
inventory as in Japan.9
Figure 2 reveals some additional features when
inventory changes are viewed over shorter periods.
During the 1970s, when JIT became widely adopted
in Japan, the inventory differential between Japan and
the USA reached its widest point. The gap has since
narrowed, as JIT met with diminishing returns in
Japan while being increasingly implemented in the
USA. Both countries have seen cyclical fluctuation in
inventones, stemming from oil shocks (in late 1973
and 1979) and other business cycle effects.
~ 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Managerial and Decision Economics, 18:73-85 (1997)
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Figure 2. Total automotive supply chain inventories: Japan versus the United States, (Sources: Annual Survey of
Manufactures (USA), Census of Manufactures (Japan).
The supply chain inventories illustrated in Fig. 2
can be subdivided into: (1) irxter-tirrn buffers,
consisting of raw materials and finished goods, and
(2) internal work-in-process inventones needed to
accommodate variability and delay in manufacturing
processes.’” Below, we examine these two types of
inventones in greater detail.
Inter-firm Inventory
Figures 3(a) and 3(b) show the magnitudes of inter-
firrn inventories in Japan and the USA, measured as a
proportion of assemblers’ final sales. Comparison of
Fig. 3(a) with Fig. 2 reveals that in Japan, the total
supply chain inventory has been split fairly evenly
between internal work-in-process and inter-firm
inventones. The latter have been held mostly by
suppliers. From the late 1960s through the early
1990s, Japanese suppliers cut these inventories by
32% (RM) and 40’%.(FG). Inventones rose slightly in
the late 1980s to accommodate a trend by Japanese
assemblers toward greater product variety.
Interestingly, the largest percentage reductions
were made by the contract assemblers, who cut their
raw materials stocks by more than 71‘Yo(as compared
with a 45°A reduction by the core assemblers). The
contract assemblers typically produce relatively low-
volume vehicles, which tend to require more
inventory per unit of sales. The inventories of
contract assemblers were extremely high relative to
sales in the 1960s. Since then, substantial improve-
ments in their manufacturing operations have enabled
major inventory cuts. For example, Kanto Auto
Works, a Toyota contract assembler and early adopter
of JIT, reduced its raw materials inventory from more
than 1.2’% of sales in 1967 to less than 0.3’XOof sales
by 1991.
Figure 3(b) shows that inter-fum inventories have
been relatively high in the USA-typically more than
twice the levels of Japan. This is due, in part, to
greater physical distance between plants in the USA,
leading to greater variability in the timing of parts
deliveries. 11Moreover, storage costs are lower in the
USA, given cheaper land prices and fewer space
constraints. Nevertheless, much of the differential
may be attributed to the more limited adoption of JIT.
In the USA from the late 1960s through the early
1990s, inter-fin-n inventories fell by 21 Yo, or half the
rate of Japan. This reduction was due entirely to cuts
made by the US assemblers in their raw materials
holdings during the 1980s. In the late 1960s the
assemblers’ stocks of raw materials were more than
twice as large as the suppliers’ stocks of finished
goods. By the early 1990s, however, these supplier
and assembler inventories were approximate] y equal.
As US assemblers cut their stocks of raw materials,
the finished goods inventory of their suppliers
actually increased (Table 1). Comparison between
countries shows that Japanese suppliers held more
~ 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Managerial and Decision Economics, 18:73-85 (1997)
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Figure 3. Inter-firm inventones: (a) Japan, (b) United States. (Sources: Japanese Census of A4anujiactures, US Annual
Survey of Manufactures.)
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Table 1.
Japan
Parts
suppliers
Contract
assemblers
core
assemblers
Industry
Total
USA
Parts
suppliers
(SIC 3714)
Stampings
suppliers
(SIC 3465)
Assemblers
Issdustsy
Total
Inventories in the Automotive Supply
Chain (as a proportion of final vehicle
sales)
RM
WIP
FG
Total
Rh4
WIP
Total
RM
WIP
Total
Inter-tirm
WIP
Total
RM
WIP
FG
Total
RM
WIP
FG
Total
RM
WIP
Total
Jnter-fmn
WIP
Total
Average
1967–70
0.012
0.019
0,015
0.045
0.004
0.004
0.009
0.006
0.020
0.026
0.036
0.043
0.080
Average
1%7–70
0.019
0.023
0.012
0.054
0.006
0.005
0.001
0.011
0.027
0.029
0.056
0.064
0.057
0.121
Average
1990-93
0.008
0.012
0.009
0.028
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.003
0.010
0.013
0.021
0.023
0.044
Average
1990-93
0.020
0.016
0.013
0.049
0.003
0.003
0.001
0.007
0.014
0.011
0.025
0.051
0.030
0.081
Percent
change
–32
–38
–40
–37
–71
-56
–63
-45
–52
–50
-42
–46
–44
Percent
change
6
-34
9
–11
–51
–30
51
–35
–49
-62
–56
–21
–48
–34
Sources: Annual Survey of Manufactures (USA), Census of
Manufactures(Japan).
finished goods inventory than their US counterparts
in the 1960s, but less by the 1980s.
These statistics must be interpreted with caution, as
it may be arbitrary whether suppliers or assemblers
hold title to the inventories which serve as a buffer
between their manufacturing operations. Indeed the
US assemblers have always owned a much larger
proportion of these inventories than has been typical
in Japan. Nevertheless, the data imply that in the
USA, efforts to cut inter-firm inventories have been
initiated by the assemblers. What remains unclear is
whether (1) suppliers have failed to fully adopt JTT
methods, or (2) the burden of inventory-holding has
simply been shifted back on the suppliers. We suspect
that both apply, although the extent varies from case
to case.
Figure 4
inventoxy
ASABA
Work-In-Process Inventory
compares the IeveIs of work-in-process
for parts suppliers in Japan and the USA
over the period from 1967 to 1993. These levels were
computed as the ratio: total supplier WIP/total
supplier sales. 12 This WIP/sales ratio may be
considered as an approximate measure of average
production cycle time (Liebennan, Demeester and
Rivas, 1995).
Since the 1960s, Japanese and US parts suppliers
have made significant WIP reductions. There are,
however, important differences between the two
countries. The Japanese suppliers made fairly steady
improvements from the 1960s through the late 1980s,
when increases in product variety led to an
incremental rise in invento~. In the USA, by
contrast, parts suppliers achieved significant inven-
tory reductions in the early 1980s but subsequently
reached a plateau. US parts suppliers currently hold
nearly twice as much WIP per unit of sales as their
counterparts in Japan.
Figure 5 focuses on work-in-process inventory
held by the automotive assemblers. It plots the ratio:
total assembler wIP/total assembler sales.
Comparison of the US automotive companies with
the core assemblers in Japan shows that both groups
held comparable amounts of WIP inventory in the
early 1970s. In the mid- 1970s the Japanese made
dramatic reductions and began to lead the US firms
by a considerable margin. By the 1990s, however, the
US assemblers had caught up and possibly even
pulled ahead, holding less WIP inventory as a
fraction of sales than their counterparts in Japan.
Viewed over the entire 1967–93 period, the data
show that the US assemblers cut their WIP inventory
more gradually than the Japanese but have made
similar progress overall.
Thus, the US and Japanese assemblers have made
substantial WIP reductions, which presumably reflect
underlying improvements in their manufacturing
operations. In making international comparisons
between assemblers, however, a number of issues
must be considered. One is product variety: within a
given plant, greater variety normally leads to higher
requirements for WIP inventory. This is contirrned by
the difference between core and contract assemblers
in Japan. The contract assemblers produce a more
diverse array of lower-volume vehicles and have
historically held significantly greater amounts of
WIP. Compared with both types of assemblers in
Japan, the US assemblers generally operate more
~ 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Managerial and Decision Economics, 18:73-85 (1997)
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Figure 5. Assemblers’ WIP inventories in the United States and Japan.
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dedicated plants, with less product variety. This
would, other things equal, give rise to lower WIP
inventory requirements. Thus, the low WIP of US
assemblers may be partly attributable to the more
homogeneous product mix of US assembly plants. 13
COMPARATIVE PRODUCTIVITY
We now turn to the productivity performance of
automotive suppliers and assemblers in Japan and the
United States. If inventory reductions are linked to
productivity growth, the inventory patterns documen-
ted above should be accompanied by changes in
productivity. In particular, substantial productivity
growth should be observed for assemblers and
suppliers in Japan through the mid- 1980s. In the
US, we would expect to see sizable productivity
growth for assemblers in recent years, but Iess growth
for suppliers.
Our objective is not to present detailed productiv-
ity computations, but rather to assess the general
trends of productivity change since the 1960s for
suppliers and assemblers in the two countries. We
begin with such an assessment in Japan, followed by
the United States.
Labor Productivity: Japan
Figure 6a plots the labor productivity of Japanese
parts suppliers and core assemblers from 1967 to
1993.14 Table 2 reports average growth rates of labor
productivity during the first and second half of this
period. Labor productivity is defined as value-added
per employee in constant yen. 15 Estimates have been
derived from two alternative sources: (1) the Census
of Manufacturing, and (2) company annual financial
reports. 16
As shown in Figure 6a, the estimated levels of
labor productivity differ between the Census and
annual report data, particularly for the assemblers.
The main reason for this disparity is that the Census
data omit employees located in auxilimy units
(headquarters and support facilities), whose value-
-added is included in the manufacturing plant totals.
Labor productivity estimates derived from the Census
data are therefore biased upward. Comparable
estimates from company reports have other draw-
backs: they cover only a sample of larger firms, and
they include diversified activities. Fortunately, the
growth rates of labor productivity are similar for the
two sets of data (Table 2).
Table 2. Productivity Growth of Japanese and
US Parts Suppliers and Assemblers
AverageAnnualgmwtbrste
1967-80 ‘%’ 198(M3
ban
P&s
suppliers
Contract
assemblers
Core
assemblers
USA
Parts
suppliers
Sampings
suppliers
Assemblers
GM
Ford
Chrysler
LP(Census)
LP(AR)
LP(Census)
LP(AR)
LP(Census)
LP(AR)
LP(Census)
TFP
LP(Census)
TFP
LP(Census)
TFP
LP(AR)
LP(AR)
LP(AR)
11.4 4.3
10.5 3.6
9.1 3.3
9.9 3.6
7.9 4.0
7.8 2.4
1.1 2.6
–1.0 -0.3”
1.1 3,7
-0.2 o.2a
1.3 8.8
1.5 1,8=
1.2 4,0
3.8 8.9
2.7 5,7
‘Calculations are for 198@91. LP = [abor productivity (value-
-added per employee in constant currency). TFP = total factor
productivity. Census= Annual Survey of k4anufuctures (USA),
Census of Manufactures(Japan). AR= Company Annual Reports
(Japan AR sample includes: 39 parts suppliers, three contract
assemblers, eight core assemblers).
Ignoring biases in estimated productivity levels,
the Japanese data show a strong generaI pattern: the
productivity of both suppliers and assemblers grew
rapidly from the late 1960s through the late 1980s. As
would be expected, there was some slowing of
growth in percentage terms. Based on the Census
data, prior to 1980 the labor productivity of parts
suppliers rose at an average annual rate of 11.4°/0,
falling to 4.3% for the subsequent period. Core
assemblers’ productivity rose by 7.9°A per annum
prior to 1980, slowing to 4.0% thereafter. These
figures reveal that in Japan, parts suppliers enjoyed
faster labor productivity growth than assemblers. The
average labor productivity level of suppliers was
roughly half that of the assemblers in the mid- 1960s,
but the difference had virtually disappeared by the
1990s.
Labor Productivity: USA
The pattern of productivity growth in the US auto
industry since the 1960s has been quite different from
that observed in Japan. Figure 6(b) plots labor
productivity levels for the USA companies (value-
-added per employee, in constant dollars”) from 1967
~ 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Managerial and Decision Economics, 18:73-85 (1997)
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Figure 6. Labor productivity of (a) Japanese and (b) US parts suppliers and assemblers.
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to 1993. Estimates are derived from Census data for
automotive starnpings plants, other parts plants, and
assembly plants. We also include estimates devel-
oped from annual reports covering each of the Big 3
assemblers. A comparable sample could not be
constructed ffom annual reports for US parts
suppliers, as financial statements in the US typically
do not provide sufficient information to allow value-
-added to be estimated. 18
The data show a pattern of productivity divergence
between the US assemblers and their suppliers. The
assemblers have experienced significant productivity
growth, particularly since the early 1980s. 19 Within
the Big 3, however, differences are apparent, with
GM failing to share in the productivity gains enjoyed
by Ford and Chrysler in recent years. Post-1980
productivity growth rates ranged from 4.0% per year
at GM, to 8.9°/0 at Ford, based on data from annual
reports. GM’s poor performance may be partly
attributable to the company’s heavy involvement in
parts-making operations, which cannot be distin-
guished ffom assembly operations in the annual
reports.20 Indeed, the Census data, which are specific
to US assembly plants, show a 1980-93 productivity
growth rate of 8.8% for these plants, close to the rate
estimated from the annual reports for Ford. We
suspect, however, that the Census rate may be biased
upward by an increasing fraction of Big-3 employ-
ment assigned to auxilimy units (design, R&D, and
administration) located outside of manufacturing
plants.
The productivity trends of US automotive suppliers
have been very different from those of the assem-
blers. Since the 1960s, US supplier productivity has
been stagnant.21 Table 2 shows that average labor
productivity growth of suppliers was 1.1?4.per year in
the 1967–1 980 period, rising to 2.6% (automotive
parts) and 3.7?40(stampings) in the 1980-1993 period.
These figures fall below those of the assemblers,
particularly in the later period. On the positive side,
most of the supplier productivity growth was
recorded from 1991 to 1993, so it is possible that
this recent upward trend will continue.
Comparison between the two countries shows that
since the early 1980s, the US auto assemblers have
enjoyed higher labor productivity growth than their
Japanese counterparts, suggesting a pattern of
productivity convergence. US parts suppliers, though,
appear to have been falling behind. The labor
productivity growth of US suppliers has lagged
behind that of suppliers in Japan and assemblers in
both countries.22 These patterns of productivity
growth tend to mirror the rates of inventory reduction
described earlier.
Total Factor Productivity: USA
Labor productivity denotes utilization of a single
input and hence provides only a partial index of
manufacturing efficiency. Total fkctor productivity
(TFP), which attempts to measure the change in
output net of changes in all inputs, is commonly
regarded as a more appropriate measure of
productivity. Table 2 presents estimates of growth
in TFP, taken from the NBER database covering US
manufacturing industries through 1991 (Bartelesman
and Gray, 1994). These TFP figures represent the
annual growth in ou@t, net of changes in various
types of inputs: labor, capital, energy and materials.
Table 2 shows that since the 1960s, TFP for the US
assemblers has grown at a respectable rate averaging
about 1.7°/0 per year. For the US parts suppliers,
though, TFP growth has been negative. Thus, the
pattern indicated by TFP is similar to that shown for
labor productivity: substantial growth by US assem-
blers, but mediocre performance on average by
suppliers. Unfortunately, we do not have comparable
data on Japanese TFP.23
CONCLUSIONS
This study has presented measures of inventory and
productivity in the Japanese and US automotive
industries, distinguishing the performance of parts
suppliers from that of vehicle assemblers. The
measures reveal radical differences in performance
between suppliers and assemblers in the United
States. Since the 1980s, the US auto assemblers
have made drastic cuts in invento~ and have enjoyed
rapid productivity growth, whereas US parts suppli-
ers have stagnated along both dimensions. In Japan,
by contrast, assemblers and suppliers have long made
steady, parallel improvements in their manufacturing
operations.
Recent studies have described the successful
adoption of Japanese manufacturing methods by US
vehicle assemblers (MacDuffie and Pil, 1995), as
compared with the slow convergence of parts
suppliers in the two countries (McMillan, 1990;
Cusumano and Takeishi, 1991; Helper, 1991;
Asanuma, 1992; Helper and Sake, 1995). Our
findings clarify these trends as reflected by firms’
inventory levels. We have also shown that produc-
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tivity growth and inventory reduction have tended to
coincide for broad classes of suppliers and assemblers
in Japan and the USA.
Our most striking findings relate to the poor
performance of American automotive suppliers.
While these findings could, conceivably, be due to
errors of measurement, the broad pattern is consistent
with evidence from other sources. Prior studies have
pointed to a failure of incentives and institutions in
the automotive supply chain of the USA.24 Compared
with Japan, US supplier-assembler relations have
long been characterized by mistrust and adversarial
relations. This has limited the extent of information
sharing and collaborative, long term investments.
Moreover, the US has lacked Japanese-style ‘supplier
associations’ to promote dissemination of best-
practice manufacturing methods. This situation
may, however, be transient: the productivity data
suggest strong improvements by US suppliers begin-
ning in the 1990s, so it is possible that catch-up
by US suppliers, while belated, is now starting to
occur.
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See, for example, Cusurnano (1985), Womak, Jones
and Roos (1990), Lieberman, Lau and Williams
(1990), Fuss and Wavennan (1992), Fujimoto and
Takeishi (1995), McDuffie and Pil (1995).
Representative studies include Asarturna (1985, 1989),
Smitka (1991), Nishiguchi (1994), Fmin and
Nisbiguchi (1994), Sako (1996) and Dyer (1996a,
1996b).
Parts plants account for 74~0 of totai automotive
employment in Japan and 65°/0 in the United States,
based on estimates for 1990 by McKinsey Global
Institute (1993).
This paper is part of a broader investigation of the
automotive supply chain in Japan and the United
States. Liebertnan, Demeester and Rivas (1995)
presents historical data on the process of inventory
reduction by specific Japanese companies. Using these
data, L]ebertnan and Demeester (1995) apply statistical
methods to characterize the link between work-in-
process inventory reductions and productivity gains. A
third study, Liebertnan, Helper and Demeester (1996),
uses survey information on North American parts
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
suppliers to assess the determinants of inventory levels
in manufacturing plants.
In related studies we use data ffom company annual
financial reports. The Census &ta have the advantage
that they cover the entire industry, rather than a sample
of tinns. Moreover, the Census data are collected at the
level of individual manufacturing plants, which avoids
problems relating to companies diversification and
vertical integration. (For example, the major auto
assemblers are typically integrated into parts manu-
facturing, with some international operations and
diversification outside the automotive sector.) Thus,
the Census data allow for more comprehensive analysis
of the entire automotive supply chain within a given
country and a more precise measure of how inventories
are divided between parts and assembly plants. A
comparison of supplier inventory ratios computed from
the two data sources is provided in Liebennan, Helper
and Demeester (1996, Table 2). The corresponding
ratios are neady identical, except in the category of
finished goods where they appear larger using the
annual report data which include warehouse inven-
tories held remotely from manufacturing plants.
The term “core assembler” is from Aaanurna (1989).
The minor categories, which are excluded from our
analysis, are “carburetors, pistons, rings and valves”
(SIC 3592), “engine electrical equipment” (SIC
3694), “motor vehicle hardware” (SIC 34296) and
“automotive screw machine products” (SIC 345 11).
The first two categories include a sizable proportion of
aircraft and truck parts, The latter two categories are
defined at the five-digit SIC level, for which inventory
data are unavailable. In 1993, these four categories had
a total value of shipments of $13 billion, as compared
with $85 billion for SIC 3714 and $18 billion for SIC
3465. Omission of the minor parts categories leads to
an underestimate of about 10O/iin our figures for total
US supply chain inventones.
Thus, we exclude tire, battery and glass producers,
important categories of suppliers that sell to the
assemblers directly. A comprehensively defied supply
chain would encompass a broad range of upstream
operations such as mining, steehnaking, chemical
processing, etc., which are also omitted here.
Nakatnura and Nakamura (1989) report similar find-
ings for other manufacturing industries, indicating that
Japanese fu-tns tend to have lower desired inventory/
sales ratios and higher speeds of adjustment than US
firms.
See Lieberrnan, Helper and Demeester (1996) for an
extended discussion of the fienctions of automotive
inventories.
In 1989, the average frequency of parts delivery was
every six days in the USA, as compared with less than
one day in Japan. By 1993 the US delivery frequency
had fallen below four days. The US trend toward small
lot deliveries has, however, been offset by increased
supplier stockading of finished goods (Helper
and Sake, 1995; Lieberman, Helper and Demeester,
1996).
The supply chain comparisons presented earlier use
assembler sales as the denominator.
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13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
Another issue to be considered in making these
comparisons is that there is considerable variation in
the WIP levels of specific producers and plants. For
example, Toyota and Honda lie substantially below the
Japanese industry averages shown in Table 1 and Fig. 5
(Liebennan, Demeester and Rivas, 1995).
For simplification, the contract assemblers are ex-
cluded.
To adjust for intlation we used the wholesale price
deflator for transport equipment, published by the Bank
of Japan.
The annual report data cover eight core assemblers,
three contract assemblers and 41 parts suppliers, as
described in Lieberman, Demeester and Rivas (1995).
The group averages shown in Table 2 and Fig, 6 mask
substantial heterogeneity among firms. For example,
Toyota’s labor productivity in the 1980s was
about 50°/0 above the average of other Japanese
assemblers.
We used output price deflators for automotive parts
(SIC 3714), stampings (SIC 3465) and assembly (SIC
371 1) from the NBER database developed by
Bartlesman and Gray (1994).
The missing information typically pertains to employee
compensation.
The 1980 sample midpoint tends to understate the early
growth rates and overstates the later rates, as 1980 was
a recession year.
GM is also the most internationally diversified of the
US assemblers, which tends to reduce its average labor
productivity.
A detailed study using confidential, plant-level
Census data (Herzenberg and Campbell, 1993)
considers potential data problems that may lead to
an underestimate of automotive supplier productivity.
These include the need to adjust for changes in
capacity utilization, price-cost margins, product
quality, relative wages, environmental regulation,
and output mix. Herzenberg and Campbell conclude
that adjustment for these factors cannot account for
the meager productivity growth shown by US
automotive suppliers. Further, they find that captive
suppliers had lower productivity growth than inde-
pendents. The tails of the productivity distribution
became fatter between 1978 and 1988, suggesting the
coexistence of very high-perfonning and very-low
performing plants.
This pattern of poor relative performance by US
suppliers is corroborated by a recent study by
McKinsey Global Institute (1993).
Estimates of Japanese automotive TFP are available
but without separate breakdown for suppliers and
assemblers. Fuss and Waverman (1992) give TFP
comparisons covering the Japanese and US auto-
motive sectors as a whole. Lieberman, Lau and
Williams (1990) compare labor productivity, capital
productivity and TFP for auto assemblers in the US
and Japan.
JapatAJSA differences in supply chain incentives and
organization are discussed at length by McMillian
(1990), Asanuma (1992), Sako (1996), and Dyer
(1996a,b).
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